In this paper, I give a detailed account of the creation and the evolution of Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) -a sovereign wealth fund established in 2005 by the Korean government. In doing so, I highlight three of its unique features. First, the case of KIC effectively shows the problem of having an unclear mission statement, which allows the mission to evolve over time and multiple missions to coexist that may contradict each other. Second, it effectively reveals the typical conflicts that may arise between the central bank and the ministry involved when setting up a reserve-based sovereign wealth fund. Third, it effectively shows how a sovereign wealth fund can be operated in a way that favors the bureaucrats and the politicians. JEL Codes: F31, F34, G15, G23, G28, P16
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past few years, policy makers, market practitioners, and academics have shown keen interest in sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Reflecting this interest, there is now an explosion of research papers on the topic. Amidst this growing interest, one strand of research that is also emerging is in-depth studies on individual funds. Yi-chong and Bahgat (2010) studies the political economy of sovereign wealth funds in China, Singapore, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Russia, Australia, and Norway. Clark and Monk (2010a , 2010b , 2010c ) also have a series of papers that study sovereign wealth funds in China, Singapore, and Norway. The purpose of this paper is to add another sovereign wealth fund to the list by giving a detailed account of the creation and evolution of Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) -a sovereign wealth fund established in 2005 by the Korean government.
KIC is a small sovereign wealth fund. As of December 2010, KIC manages 37.5 billion US dollars.
According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, KIC ranks number 19 worldwide in terms of its total assets under management.
2 Even among SWFs with non-commodity origin, it ranks number 8. 3 But, KIC has a number of unique features that make it quite interesting and also worth documenting. 4 First, the case of KIC effectively shows the problem of having an unclear mission statement. It allows the mission to evolve over time and also allows inconsistent tenets within the mission statement to coexist and sometimes contradict each other. Before its creation, KIC has been discussed among policymakers as a macroeconomic policy tool, addressing issues such as surges of capital inflows. When
Korea accumulated large FX reserves and experienced losses from reversed margin -higher domestic interest rate -and depreciation of US dollars, KIC has been discussed as a way to reduce the opportunity costs of holding large reserves. At the time of its creation, KIC was justified as an apparatus to promote central bank and the ministry involved when setting up a reserve-based sovereign wealth fund. 5 Since KIC was to be set up by the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) and manage FX reserves owned and entrusted by the Bank of Korea (BOK) -the central bank -there were conflicts between the two, which had to be resolved initially by the Presidential Office and later at the National Assembly. 6 BOK initially opposed the idea of setting up KIC on grounds that the level of reserve was not enough and that MOFE is trying to establish KIC to secure new positions for its required bureaucrats. Even when BOK agreed to entrust its foreign reserve assets, the dispute continued between the two. MOFE wanted to make BOK's entrustment mandatory and also prohibit BOK from imposing any investment restrictions. On the other hand, BOK wanted to enter an investment managing contract that gives to itself as much discretion as possible.
Third, the case of KIC effectively shows how a sovereign wealth fund can be operated in a way that favors the bureaucrats and the politicians. Despite the efforts made by a civil activist group and the opposition party, Korea adopted the Korea Investment Corporation Act under terms considerably favorable to the Ministry of Finance and Economy. 7 The actual operation of KIC in subsequent years confirms such a claim. Its CEOs and auditors were often appointed among ex-bureaucrats. The level of disclosure is also kept at its minimum. People in senior positions were forced out during the first year of new Presidency.
The experiences documented in this paper can also be informative for the policy makers in other countries that are contemplating either to create a new sovereign wealth fund (e.g. Thailand) or to make their central banks entrust reserve assets to existing sovereign wealth funds that are currently managing its own capital (e.g. China).
This paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a detailed account of KIC's origin. In particular, I explore the various motives behind the creation of KIC in a chronological order. This is followed by the discussion on key issues that were debated during the legislative process among various stakeholders. A large portion of the discussion is allocated to the governance structure of KIC. Section III discusses the evolving views on KIC's mission and the actual operation of KIC after its creation. It also assesses KIC against the code of conduct set forth by the international community. Section IV concludes.
5 Truman (2011) states that Asian SWFs that are disproportionately funded out of foreign exchange reserves will receive closer scrutiny than the SWFs of other countries. 6 Such conflict did not arise in the case of China Investment Corporation (CIC). This is because CIC manages its own capital instead of managing reserve assets entrusted by the People's Bank of China. KIC, on the other hand, is an asset managing company managing assets owned and entrusted by BOK. This is the arrangement one can find between the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). 7 In 2008, the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) was renamed as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF).
II. THE ORIGIN

Background and Early Discussions (1999-2001)
Resurgence of Capital Inflows (1999 -)
The very first time policy makers discussed the establishment of a Korean sovereign wealth fund -Korea Investment Corporation (KIC) -dates back to November 1999. By then, Korea had completely dispersed the concern over its foreign exchange liquidity condition. The KRW-USD exchange rate that peaked at 1,964.8 on December 24, 1997 was already down to 1,155.90 by June 1999. 8 The level of FX reserves, which was only 4 billion US dollars on December 18 1997, reached 70 billion UD dollars by November 1999.
Policymakers at the Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) were instead troubled with an entirely opposite problem: surges of capital inflows. On top of a huge current account surplus (42.6 billion US dollars in 1998 and expecting well above 20 billion US dollars in 1999), they were expecting a surplus even in the financial account. In October, financial account switched to a surplus of 0.9 billion US dollars from a deficit of 1.6 billion US dollars in the previous month. In November, it recorded a 2.6 billion US dollars surplus. Foreign portfolio investment contributed 90% of this surplus. This made policymaker uneasy as surges of capital inflows may appreciate the domestic currency value, and then deteriorate the current account balance. A continued financial account surplus coupled with a chronic current account deficit was believed to be one of the key factors behind the 1997 crisis. The policy makers did not want to make Korea vulnerable again to sudden stop of capital inflows.
Engaging in sterilized FX market intervention was one solution, as it can insulate the exchange rate from capital inflows. But, it was also a controversial solution. Trading partners -the U.S. in particularmay label such a practice an unacceptable exchange rate manipulation. An alternative measure was to encourage Korean residents to engage in overseas portfolio investment. Their demand for US dollars might mitigate the downward pressure on the KRW-USD exchange rate. By November 1999, MOFE was contemplating a measure to exempt overseas portfolio investment from the capital gains tax.
Visit to Singapore and Hong Kong (November 29 -December 1, 1999) Against this backdrop, Ministry officials from the Foreign Exchange Policy Division made a business trip to Singapore and Hong Kong in late November. The purpose was to learn how the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC) works and how the central banks of Singapore and Hong Kong manage their FX reserves. 9 The trip was short but fruitful. The Ministry officials realized that setting up a sovereign wealth fund similar to GIC might solve the dilemma they were facing. 10 They learned that Singapore, a country that has adopted an exchange rate-based monetary policy, heavily intervenes in the FX market and transfers a significant portion of its FX reserves to GIC. 11 It is no coincidence that the year Singapore adopted the exchange rate-based monetary policy (1981) is also the year GIC was established. By December, the merits of establishing a sovereign wealth fund were well understood within the Ministry. Parrado (2004) . 12 The author of this paper authored this internal document. 13 It was expected that the size of National Pension Fund (NPF) would be phenomenal. The most recent projection, made in 2008, states that the fund will peak in 2043 at 2,607 trillion KRW (approximately, 2.5 trillion US dollars). NPF was established was established by the National Pension Act to serve as a reserve fund to meet the liabilities of the National Pension Scheme.
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Deterioration of BOK's Balance
President Noh and Northeast Asia Financial Hub (December 2002 -March 2004)
President Roh's Election Pledge (December 2002)
The discussion of establishing KIC submerged for more than a year. A window of opportunity, however, opened with the new administration that set the goal of making Seoul a preeminent financial center in The Committee laid out a number of rationales behind this decision. First, asset management is an industry that requires minimal investment in tangible assets, which makes it highly mobile, and therefore easier to relocate. Second, its growth would enlarge and deepen Korea's capital market, then considered small relative to the size of its economy. Third, the demand for asset management service was then growing rapidly. The life expectancy was increasing and the size of assets managed by National Pension
Fund was expected to reach 50% of GDP by 2040. Fourth, despite its growth potential, Asia's asset management industry still lagged behind those of other regions.
But the proposal that attracted the most attention was establishing KIC. As its raison d'être, the road map laid out three points. Obviously, one was managing part of FX reserves in more lucrative assets.
The second was to attract foreign asset management companies to Seoul, and thereby transform Seoul into Northeast Asia's "niche" financial hub. As a way of doing this, it suggested that KIC give mandates to foreign asset management companies, and thereby induce them to relocate to Seoul. As mentioned earlier, this is precisely the measure Singapore took in 1998. The joint report also mentioned that setting up KIC would allow Korea to get better access to high quality market information from its service provides. Interestingly, the joint report did not mention the need to use KIC as a countermeasure against capital inflows. The Presidential Committee and MOFE must have considered it inappropriate to explicitly disclose such a purpose, even if it was true.
The joint report also set forth the basic legal and financial structure of KIC. First, it was decided that a separate bill establishing KIC be prepared for submission to the National Assembly. Second, on internal control, the report proposes to adopt a single-tier board system. That is, one board would perform two functions, supervisory and managerial. Under this system, the board would be composed not only of shareholder representatives (government) and outside independent directors, but also some executives. 27 This is in contrast to the earlier proposal to set up Management Evaluation
Committee, which does not have any executive members, and therefore presumes a two-tier board system.
The report saw more drawbacks from a two-tier system than from a single-tier system. First, given that the National Assembly and BAI may exercise some supervisory roles, having a separate supervisory board is redundant. Second, if the supervisory board becomes inactive or obsolete because of its redundancy, there will be no role for the outside directors to play. Third, if responsibilities are not clearly defined ex ante between the two boards, they may shift the blame to each other ex post. On candidate nomination, the report proposes to establish a nomination committee, the members of which are, in turn, appointed by the National Assembly, MOFE, and BOK. 28 On eligibility requirements, the report proposes that former government officials or BOK employees cannot serve as board members unless five years have passed since their departure. Also, the report proposes that executive board members have working experience in the field of investment management for at least 10 years.
Third, on external discipline and monitoring, the report stresses the importance of transparency in KIC's investment management practices. 29 Although, board meeting minutes and voting results need not 27 The report proposes a board composed of nine members (independent chair, other five outside directors, CEO, and two ex officio members from MOFE and BOK). 28 When nominating outside director candidates, the report proposes a nomination committee composed of 6 members (2 appointed by the Speaker of the National Assembly, 2 appointed by the Minister of Finance and Economy, and 2 appointed by the Governor of BOK). When nominating a CEO candidate, the report proposes a nomination committee composed of 12 members (add 6 outside directors to the outside director candidate nomination committee). 29 In this regard, the experts that drafted the report had in their minds the Norwegian Petroleum Fund as KIC's benchmark. Norway's Government Pension Fund -its new name since 2006 -is known for the level of its transparency. MOFE, on the other hand, was using GIC as KIC's benchmark. GIC is far from being be disclosed, it emphasizes that KIC's investment policy statement (IPS), its sub-rules, and related procedures be fully disclosed. It also stresses public disclosure of detailed investment management results.
Exceptions would be yearly asset allocation plans and individual securities held by KIC, the disclosure of which may produce more problems than benefits. Such prescriptions are in contrast to the earlier proposal prepared by MOFE and the Presidential Committee that supports minimal public disclosure. The report also emphasizes that private sector institutions -accounting firms and global custodians -play external disciplinary and monitoring roles in addition to the National Assembly and BAI.
Fourth, on KIC's investment policy statement, the report stresses that it is strongly preferable that KIC have a single mission and explicitly argues that "maximizing international purchasing power, taking into account an acceptable level of risk" should be the sole mission of KIC. 30 To give constituents a clear sense of direction, the report emphasizes that KIC's IPS makes it clear that other objectives, such as promoting onshore asset management industry, are subordinate to the mission stated above. On KIC's portfolio, the report proposes to ban investments in KRW-denominated assets by law. It expresses concerns that, if domestic investments are allowed, government officials or politicians may be tempted to misuse KIC in their favor. The report also stresses that KIC adopt a clear proxy voting guideline. Finally, it makes it clear that the decision to let KIC manage the overseas assets of National Pension Fund (NPF)
lies solely in the hands of NPF Management Committee members.
Key Issues and Legislative Process (April 2004 -March 2005)
Presidential Committee versus MOFE (April 2004 -June 2004)
Even before the Presidential Committee finalized its proposal on the governance structure of KIC, MOFE came up with its first draft of the Korean Investment Corporation Act. Since then (April 17), MOFE has gone through at least seven revisions before the government finally submitted the bill to the National The final September bill states that KIC is established to enhance the efficiency in managing assets entrusted by the Government, the BOK, and others, and thereby pursue the development of the financial industry and contribute to the nation's economy. Thus the mission statement remains vague and elusive.
Second, the Presidential Committee and MOFE hotly debated the question of board structure. The
Presidential Committee supported the single-tier board system, following recommendations made in the consulting report, while MOFE supported the two-tier system. MOFE argued that a single-tier system cannot be justified in the absence of an entity that serves the function of a shareholders'
meeting. MOFE also argued that most of the state-owned corporations in Korea have a two-tier system. In the end, the two sides struck a compromise, that KIC will have a two-tier system, but KIC's President will be a member of both boards. 33 In the government's final bill, the board with the supervisory role was named the Steering Committee, while the management board was named Board of Directors.
Third, there were disagreements on how Civil Members will be appointed. MOFE's initial draft prescribed that there be three Civil Members: one appointed by the Chairman of the Korea Federation of Banks (KFB) among commercial bank presidents, another appointed by the Chairman of the Korea Securities Dealers Association (KSDA) among securities firm presidents, and lastly one appointed by the President of the Korean Institute of Certified Public Accountants (KICPA) among accounting firm presidents. Given the influence MOFE can exert over these trade associations, it was doubtful that they can be independent from MOFE and perform the necessary monitoring role. The Presidential Committee, on the other hand, supported the position taken in the consulting report, that is, establishing an Outside Director Nomination Committee, the members of which are, in turn, appointed by the National Assembly, MOFE, and BOK. In the end, a compromise was made. According to the bill submitted to the National Assembly, KIC must disclose the basic directions of its investment policy and the overview of its investment performance. MOFE was not enthusiastic about transparency. According to this bill, the details on this disclosure were delegated to KIC's articles of incorporation (AOI).
Tenth, on the relationship with asset entrusting organizations, MOFE's initial draft states that the Minister of Finance and Economy can request any public institution, provided that they are listed in the Presidential Enforcement Decree to entrust the management of its assets to KIC, and upon such request, those institutions cannot refuse. Furthermore, the draft states that any investment management contract between asset-entrusting organizations and KIC cannot have provisions that can restrict the way KIC manages the entrusted assets. The Presidential Committee strongly opposed such draconian provisions, which led MOFE to revise the bill.
Government versus PSPD (June 2004 -September 2004)
The government's bill had to overcome a number of hurdles before it finally passed at the National To let the Steering Committee take a leadership role and to let Civil Members effectively monitor the Ministry, it was important that such functions be performed, not by the Minister, but by the Steering Committee.
Second, PSPD was concerned with the level of transparency the draft bill prescribed. It stressed that the secrecy of its management could not be justified on grounds that disclosure might weaken the government's ability to defend its currency in times of crisis. KIC would be managing excess reserves not likely to be used in FX market interventions. It also stressed the importance of disclosing KIC's target policy mix and the actual allocations. Once disclosed, politicians or bureaucrats would have a hard time influencing KIC to invest more in certain asset classes. PSPD also emphasized that a sufficient level of disclosure would allow the general public to directly monitor KIC and pressure the National Assembly and BAI to carry out their monitoring roles more effectively. In the absence of such public disclosure, PSPD worried that the two organizations would suffer from moral hazard problems.
Third, PSPD expressed concerns over delegating important decisions to the Presidential Enforcement Decree and to the Articles of Incorporation. Once delegated, the National Assembly would have no control over the matter, and there was a possibility that MOFE might water down the requirements. An example is the eligibility requirements for Civil Members who would serve on the Steering Committee. Given the importance of ensuring their independence and expertise, it was strongly management sector, rather than to provide a mechanism to intervene in the market or a substitute for exchange rate flexibility. However, it believes that strong safeguards are necessary to guard against the risks involved. The agency's law should guarantee its operational independence, investment guidelines, and rules for any future transfer of reserves. Moreover, the KIC's accounts should be regularly and fully disclosed to the public, and it should refrain from investing domestically, at least until its credibility is established." The author of this paper had a meeting with the IMF Resident Representative (Kenneth Kang) in December 2003 and with the IMF mission team in May 2004. 35 Among many action bodies of PSPD, this press conference was organized by the Economic Reform Center. As a member of this Center, the author of this paper drafted the proposal.
advised that detailed provisions be stipulated in the Act. This was also the position taken in the consulting report commissioned by the Presidential Committee. On matters related to subcommittees, compliance, and investment ethics, the draft bill was completely silent, in effect delegating detailed provisions either to the Presidential Enforcement Decree or to the Articles of Incorporation.
Fourth, PSPD pointed out that Steering Committee would suffer from a structural problem as it pursued two conflicting interests. According to the draft bill, the Steering Committee was to be composed of members representing shareholders (the Minister of Finance and Economy), asset-entrusting organizations (the Governor of BOK, the Minister of Finance and Economy, and other public organizations in the future), and the general public (Civil Members). It was not hard to see that the interests of asset-entrusting organizations and that of asset managers would be in conflict. Each party would be involved in decisions that ought to be determined solely by the other party. Thus PSPD suggested removing members representing asset-entrusting organizations from the Steering Committee.
In addition to the proposals mentioned above, PSPD made many others. It suggested (i) prioritizing multiple missions, (ii) removing asset entrusting organizations and managers from the Civil Member Nomination Committee to ensure the Committee's independence, (iii) introducing a provision on whistleblowing, (vi) giving asset entrusting organizations the exclusive right to make decisions on withdrawal, investment restrictions, and management fees, (vii) writing up a short list giving KIC the power to veto public disclosure instead of giving KIC discretionary veto power, and (viii) making it mandatory for KIC to be subject to external audit by private-sector accounting firms, in addition to audit and inspection by BAI.
PSPD's public criticism helped the Presidential Committee persuade MOFE to make further revisions to the draft bill before its final submission to the National Assembly in September. It also heavily influenced the National Assembly that later revised the bill substantially.
Government versus National Assembly (November 204 -March 2005)
The bill was submitted to the National Assembly on September 17, 2004. But it was not until November 17 that the National Assembly started to discuss the bill. On November 26, the Finance and Economy
Committee -the standing committee at the National Assembly overseeing the Ministry of Finance and Economy -organized a public hearing. Among the four experts summoned, two opposed the bill, while the other two supported it. Concerns raised by the opposing witnesses can be summarized as follows.
36 36 The author of this paper was one of the four that testified before the committee. The summary is based on my own testimony. Second, they raised concerns over the provisions that would have allowed KIC to incur debts and to make investments in KRW-denominated domestic assets. Under such an arrangement, KIC would be vulnerable to pressures to boost the domestic stock market or to manipulate exchange rate in the FX market. 37 In particular, incurring KRW-denominated debts refuted the very rationale of its establishment.
As laid out in the Presidential Committee's report, dated December 11, 2003, the government was establishing KIC to enhance the returns on its FX reserves, and thereby minimize the loss BOK was suffering from high KRW interest rates. Incurring further debts denominated in KRW would only make the matter worse. Also, investments in domestic assets can offset the effect of sterilization. That is, the contractionary effect of issuing KRW-denominated debt either by BOK or by the government can be offset by the expansionary effect of KIC purchasing domestic assets. They urged the law makers to prohibit KIC from incurring debt and from investing in domestic assets.
Third, they strongly argued that BOK, as an asset-entrusting owner, should have the exclusive right to make withdrawals and to impose restrictions on KIC's asset management. They discussed the practice followed in Singapore between the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and CIG. Accordingly, they suggested removing the provision in the bill that prescribed the investment management contract between asset-entrusting owners and KIC be determined by the Presidential Enforcement Decree.
Fourth, they raised concerns that the bill gave too much statutory power to the Minister of Finance and Economy, whose tasks it would have been to approve the Articles of Incorporation (AOI), nominate the KIC President candidate, and appoint the Directors and Auditor of KIC. They argued that such powers should be given to the Steering Committee. They also argued that detailed eligibility requirements for Civil Members and KIC President be stipulated in the Act instead of being delegated to the Presidential Enforcement Decree, which was de facto under the control of MOFE. Moreover, they suggested having 37 To purchase US dollars in the FX market, KIC would have to borrow in KRW.
provisions related to subcommittees, compliance and investment ethics in the Act. On subcommittees, they proposed to establish an investment committee and a compensation committee composed of Civil Members of the Steering Committee. This is in contrast to the provision in the bill that allows the establishment of advisory committees composed of outside experts. To ensure the independence of the Civil Member Nomination Committee, the witnesses also suggested adding the speaker of the National
Assembly or the Chairperson of the Finance and Economy Committee to the list of persons eligible to appoint Nomination Committee members. Fifth, they criticized the level of transparency the bill prescribed. In particular, they pointed out the problem of giving KIC the power to veto the National Assembly's disclosure of KIC-related non-public information. Instead of granting KIC such discretionary veto power, they argued for adding a provision in the Act listing the items that should not be publicly disclosed. Other items, they argued, should be fully disclosed to ensure effective outside monitoring.
Sixth, they criticized the creation of KIC Establishment Committee as provided in the bill's addendum, which required this Committee to assume two important tasks before KIC's official launch. Specific provisions directing KIC to adopt internal control standards and to appoint a compliance officer whose nomination must be approved in advance by the Steering Committee.
Deletion of provisions allowing the investment management contract between KIC and the entrusting organizations to be dictated by the Presidential Enforcement Decree. In effect, the contract became a voluntary one to be negotiated between the two parties.
A requirement that assets entrusted by different organizations be kept in separate accounts.
Specification of management fees, payment procedures, and that the form of such payment should be negotiated between KIC and the entrusting organization.
domestic/overseas financial institutions of more than a certain size set forth by the Presidential Enforcement Decree, or (iii) an attorney-at-law or a certified public accountant with10 or more years of experience in finance, investment or company auditing. The revised bill also bans employees of asset entrusting organizations from being appointed as Civil Members of the Steering Committee. The revised bill also imposes a three-year cooling period, during which KIC retirees cannot serve as Steering Committee Civil Members. 39 The KIC President must have 10 or more years of experience in either finance or investment related areas. 40 The CIO must have 10 or more years of experience in investment management at international financial organizations or domestic/overseas financial institutions of more than a certain size set forth by the Presidential Enforcement Decree 41 Auditor must either be (i) a person with 10 or more years of experience in finance or investment related areas, or (ii) a certified public accountant (CPA) with 10 or more years of experience in corporate auditing. 42 The Decree later names the Korea Money and Finance Association to be the academic association that can nominate Civil Member Nomination Committee members. 43 With the merger between AMAK and KSDA in 2009, the nomination is now carried out by the Korea Financial Investment Association (KFIA). 44 The Decree later set the threshold to be 1 trillion KRW (approximately, 1 billion US dollars).
A ban on investment in KRW-denominated domestic assets. Specifically, it stated that KIC, in principle, must manage its entrusted assets only in those denominated in foreign currencies. If KIC manages KRW-denominated assets temporarily for an unavoidable reason, it must be either in the form of bank deposits or passively held public debt.
Banning KIC the right to issue debt.
Stipulation of the items that must be disclosed by KIC. According to this revision, KIC must disclose (i) the financial statements of KIC and the accounting rules used, (ii) the auditors' report, (iii) investment policy statement approved by the Steering Committee, (iv) the total assets under management, (v) the overall investment performance, (vi) asset allocation weights and performance of each asset class set forth by the Presidential Enforcement Committee, and (vii) changes in its fund managers.
45
Lastly, the revised bill removed the provision giving KIC the power to veto the National Assembly's disclosure of KIC-related non-public information. It granted the National Assembly the right to disclosure such information provided that it is approved by the standing committee overseeing KIC.
The bill passed the plenary session on March 24, 2005, and took effect from July 1 st 2005.
III. EVOLUTION
Evolving Views on KIC's Mission
As mentioned earlier, the official mandate of KIC can be found in the Korea Investment Corporation Act.
In Article 1, the Act states that KIC is to conduct efficient management of assets which are entrusted by the Government, the Bank of Korea, and other sources, and thereby contribute to the development of Korea's financial industry. Neither the Act nor its enforcement decree make any further effort to clarify what exactly "efficient management" means or what constitutes "the development of the financial industry." Such vague mission statement can give rise to two possibilities. One is that KIC's mission can change over time. Another is that it can have multiple missions. Both are problematic. Under such circumstances, the institution cannot have a well designed investment policy statement (IPS), and managers subject to that can lose their sense of direction, ultimately damaging its performance. In this 45 It is not clear why the Finance and Economy Committee introduced a provision that requires KIC to disclose the name of its fund managers. To meet this requirement, KIC in practice discloses the names of its internal fund managers. KIC, however, does not disclose the names of its external managers, nor does it disclose those of its custodians.
sub-section, I go over how policy makers' views of KIC's mission evolved over time.
Countermeasure against Capital Inflows
As discussed in the previous section, the idea behind KIC first emerged as a tool to address the problem related to surges of capital inflows. The outbreak of a currency crisis triggered a huge capital outflow. In Moreover, the accumulation of reserves was inevitable to later pay back the Korean government's disbursements from the IMF under the stand-by agreement and loans from the World Bank. Third, the KRW-USD market at that time was too thin to handle large foreign exchange transactions. Without smoothing operations, it was obvious that the exchange rate could be easily misaligned from its fundamentals. 46 For a detailed account of Korean bank's short-term debt restructuring, see Kim and Byeon (2002) . 47 For a detailed account of Korea's corporate restructuring during 1998 -2001 , see Mako (2002 .
Between current account and financial account surpluses, policymakers in Korea were particularly concerned with the latter because surges of capital inflows would appreciate the domestic currency and then deteriorate the current account balance. The currency crisis in 1997 clearly demonstrated that a sudden stop in capital inflows coupled with a current account deficit made the country extremely vulnerable. Against this policy dilemma, a foreign exchange market intervention appeared as the obvious solution for the policymakers. By purchasing dollars in the market, the government eased the downward pressure on the exchange rate, and thereby maintained the price competitiveness of Korea export products.
Also, the accumulated foreign exchange reserve remained available for use later in time of crisis.
But, Korean policymakers understood that foreign exchange market intervention cannot be used for extended periods of time. They feared that trading partners might view it as exchange rate manipulation.
Policymakers wanted a less controversial solution. One was encouraging residents to engage in overseas portfolio investment. If enough money is invested abroad, this will offset capital inflows and thereby ease the pressure on the exchange rate. In fact, in December 1999, the Ministry of Finance and Economy announced that it would exempt overseas portfolio investments from the capital gains tax. The government, however, did not achieve much in this regard. In 2000, the private sector's overseas portfolio investment amounted to only 0.5 billion US dollars Against this backdrop, establishing a sovereign wealth fund dedicated for overseas investment appeared as an attractive alternative. One obvious merit is that government can force the fund to invest in overseas assets, while it cannot do so to private Korean investors. Since part of the foreign exchange reserve will have to be transferred to the fund, the reserve will accumulate much more slowly and thus engender less controversy.
Greater returns on FX reserve
With the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves a new concern emerged. Since Korea sterilized most of its interventions, it issued huge amounts of KRW denominated debt -either monetary stabilization bonds or foreign exchange stabilization bonds -and the interest they had to pay was well above the interest earned on foreign currency reserves. This problem was aggravated with continued dollar depreciation against the Korean won. So, the government lost money on both interest and currency.
Clearly, this represented a deviation from the interest parity condition, and it did not disappear for many years; in the meantime, losses kept accumulating. 
Seoul as Northeast Asia's Financial Hub
In December 2003, the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asia Business Hub and MOFE released a joint report that proposed the establishment KIC. The newly added rationale was to use KIC as a vehicle to attract foreign asset management companies to Seoul, and thereby transform Seoul into Northeast Asia's financial hub. It suggested that KIC give mandates to foreign asset management companies and induce them to relocate in Seoul. This is precisely the measure Singapore took in 1998. As mentioned earlier, GIC and MAS earmarked 35 billion SGD (approximately 19 billion USD; 25 billion SGD from GIC and 10 billion SGD from MAS) to be placed out to external managers, regardless of nationality, over three years till 2000. They were hoping that this would act as seed money to grow the Singapore fund 49 This fund issues KRW-denominated bonds and purchases dollars using the Korean won it financed. It then deposits the dollars at the Bank of Korea (BOK). In 2002, the coupon rate on the foreign exchange stabilization bond was 8.0%, while the deposit rate at BOK was only 2.7%. Korean won also appreciated in 2002 by 10% (1326.1 → 1200.4). The fund's dollar deposits at BOK also constitute the total foreign exchange reserve. 50 Since foreign exchange stabilization bond is a government bond, its issues requires approval from the National Assembly. Monetary stabilization bond, which is issued by BOK, on the other hand, is not a government bond, and its issuance therefore is not subject to National Assembly's approval. At first glance, the reason behind the acute crisis hardly differs from that Korea experienced during the Asian crisis back in the late 1990s. Korean banks had a huge external -mostly short-term -debt.
With a second look, however, fundamental differences between the two crises emerge. Back then, local problems largely drove the crisis. This time, the crisis originated outside of Korea, triggered by problems in other countries. The nature of excessive short-term dollar borrowing is also quite different. Back then, it was to make loans to Korean corporations. This time, it was to square the long dollar positions Korean banks entered when they purchased dollars forward from Korea ship manufacturers and Korean overseas portfolio investors. 51 <Table 1> reports the volume of dollar forwards sold during the pre-crisis period.
FX risk management using FX derivatives sat at the heart of the crisis. 56 See E-Daily (February 25, 2010 and July 19, 2010) . MOSF, however, officially released a commentary stating that the Ministry has never deliberated such an arrangement. 57 The report by Jeong and Jung (2010) was issued by Samsung Economic Research Institute (SERI).
partners.
A number of concerns arose, though, over this idea. First, a foreign exchange liquidity crisis is now less likely thanks to a number of policy measures taken by the government in recent years. In June 2010, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance announced that it will impose a limit on banks' (including branches of foreign banks in Seoul) FX forward positions. The limits are 50% and 250% of equity capital for Korean banks and foreign bank Seoul branches, respectively. This measure will limit the amount of FX swap transactions between the two, and thereby lower the level of Korea's external debt. Moreover, in
December 2010, the Korean government announced that it would impose a "Macro-prudential Stability
Levy" on non-deposit foreign currency liabilities. This was announced a month after the G20 Seoul
Summit where the leaders agreed on the need for design and implementation of special macro-prudential procedures to curb excessive capital flows. The measure has four key features: (i) the Levy will be charged on "non-deposit foreign currency liabilities" that appears in bank balance sheets; (ii) the Levy will first apply to banks including domestic banks and foreign bank branches; (iii) the Levy rate will vary according to debt maturity; (iv) the Levy will be collected in foreign currency and later used in times of crisis to stabilize the financial market. With such a policy in place, there will be less need to use KIC as a vehicle to prevent FX liquidity crises.
Another concern arose with particular regard to a potential moral hazard problem. Since KIC will continue rolling over its FX swap agreements even in times of FX liquidity crises, Korean banks may be ex ante less wary of their FX liquidity management. In essence, the new arrangement is no different from Bank of Korea directly providing dollar liquidity via FX swap in times of crisis. If this is known ex ante, the same kind of moral hazard problem may arise.
Lastly, there is an argument that the root cause of excessive FX swap transactions is government's intervention in the spot market combined with sterilization (Song, 2010) . Intervention may have slowed down the fall of the KRW-USD exchange rate and sterilization may have slowed down the fall of the domestic interest rate. This may have caused the continued deviation from covered interest parity and lured in more FX swap transactions between foreign bank Seoul branches and Korean domestic banks.
Such a diagnosis calls for less FX market intervention, and if this is sufficient to lower the volume of FX swap transactions, there may be no role for KIC to play. 
Operations and Portfolio Management
Portfolio Management
As of December 2010, the total assets under management are 37.5 billion US dollars. This ranks KIC the 19 th largest sovereign wealth fund (SWF) in the world. Among SWFs with non-commodity origins, it is the 8 th largest. According to the government, KIC's total assets under management will be increased to 50 billion US dollars by 2015.
Pursuant to the KIC Act, KIC discloses its Investment Policy Statement (IPS). 67 Despite the mission statement in the KIC Act, the IPS of KIC states that it should achieve a stable and continuous return exceeding the benchmark within an appropriate level of risk. Benchmarks are disclosed in KIC's annual report. 68 Other than that, the IPS does not give much useful information. There is no discussion the KIC Act. Also, it undermines the very reason why the National Assembly revised the bill and explicitly prescribed KIC to disclose its long-term investment policy statement. The idea was to allow the general public to monitor the operations of KIC, but with the current level of disclosure, such purpose cannot be served. This new emphasis on internal management, however, is in conflict with the idea of attracting foreign asset management companies into Seoul by hiring them as KIC's external managers. Also note that KIC does not disclose the list of its external managers, nor does it disclose its global custodian. Instead, it reveals only the names of its internal fund managers, clearly a result of the careless drafting of the KIC Act that prescribes KIC to disclose changes of its fund managers. KIC interpreted this as disclosing the names of each internal fund manager.
In its annual report, KIC briefly discusses how it exercises its voting rights. The annual report states that KIC has drawn up related procedures to ensure voting rights are exercised appropriately, but KIC does not disclose its proxy voting guidelines, nor does it disclose the related procedures. Moreover, the annual report states that KIC's basic policy is to maintain a neutral stance for holdings of less than 1% or in the case of externally managed investments.
Among the KIC's Special Investments, the most noteworthy is its 2 billion US dollars acquisition of Merrill Lynch preferred stocks back in January 15, 2008. KIC was joined by two other investors:
Kuwait Investment Authority and Japan's Mizuho Financial Group. Also, Temaseck Holdings was the largest shareholder of Merrill Lynch, holding 9.6% of common shares. This was the time when herds of sovereign wealth funds sought to acquire ailing US banks. They were betting that the US would soon recover from its subprime mortgage crisis, which proved to be wrong.
More specifically, KIC purchased mandatory convertible preferred stocks with a 9% dividend yield that was scheduled to be converted to 38,160,000 shares of common stock in October 15, 2010. 72 KIC projected that the conversion would give KIC a 3% stake in Merrill Lynch. As market conditions worsened, Merrill Lynch continued to take write-downs and losses. As of July 25, the common share price fell down to 27.5 dollars. Pursuant to the price reset clause, this prompted KIC to renegotiate the conversion terms with Merrill Lynch. On July 28, KIC announced that it converted its preferred shares into 72,243,217 common shares of Merrill Lynch and also received a dividend worth of 30 million US dollars, an inevitable move to minimize the loss. At the time of conversion, preferred shares were worth only 1,473 million US dollars for KIC. 73 Conversion made its investment worth 2,138 million US 71 If we assume that special investments (3.7%) are internally managed and all other alternative assets (5.6%) are externally managed, the fraction of internal management drops slightly down to 69.8%. 72 The conversion price is, in effect, 52.4 US dollars (= 2,000,000,000 US dollars / 38,160,000). 73 1,017 million USD worth of common stocks (38,160,000 shares X 26.65 dollars) + 397.5 million USD of dividend expected until October 2010 + 58.5 million USD of dividend KIC already received = 1,473 million USD.
be based on economic and financial criteria, SWFs could also make appropriate ex post disclosures.
According to the same principle, SWFs are also expected to disclose their general approach to board representation. As mentioned earlier, KIC does not ex ante disclose its proxy voting guideline, nor does it make appropriate ex post disclosure of its proxy voting. Also, no policy has been disclosed by KIC regarding board representation.
According to the Sovereign Wealth Fund Institute, KIC scores 9 out of a perfect score of 10 in terms of its transparency. 81 My own calculation, however, reveals that KIC should score 6. 82 It should get 0 points on the following evaluation items: (i) Fund provides ownership percentages of company holdings, and geographic locations of holdings; (ii) fund provides total portfolio value, returns, and management compensation; (iii) fund provides guidelines in reference to ethical standards, investment policies, and enforcer of guidelines; and (iv) if applicable, the fund identifies external managers.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, I give a detailed account of the creation and the evolution of Korea Investment Corporation effectively shows how much a sovereign wealth fund can be operated in a way that favors the bureaucrats and the politicians.
The paper also allows one to draw a number of policy recommendations for KIC. First, the Korea Investment Corporation Act should be revised to narrow down the scope of KIC's mission. A more focused mission statement would prevent KIC from deviating away from its original purpose. It also enables KIC to have an internally-consistent investment policy that can discipline its managers and also
give them a sense of direction. Second, the Act or the Enforcement Decree should be revised so that KIC can be run in a much transparent way. For example, it should not leave out the details of its strategic asset allocation (SAA) when disclosing its investment policy statement (IPS). It should also disclose its investment performance separately for each asset class. When doing so, it should not use the classification 81 The index is named as the Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index.
that lumps up all securities in one asset class. Moreover, it should disclose the list of its external managers instead of its internal fund managers. Third, the investment management contract between BOK and KIC should be revised so that KIC can invest the entrusted funds in alternative assets. Otherwise, KIC cannot improve BOK's balance sheet and thus fail to fulfill one of its most important missions. Once KIC invests BOK-entrusted assets in alternative assets, they will be excluded from Korea's FX reserves.
APPENDIX 1 Korea's FX Liquidity Crisis of 2008-2009
The following chart effectively shows what happened before (2005) (2006) Suppose a Korean bank entered a forward contract with a shipbuilding company, the former taking a long position in USD and the latter taking a short position. This bank's balance sheet and foreign exchange position will be as follows.
Balance Sheet FX Position
On B/S Spot Position 0 Off B/S Forward Position + 100 USD Buy forward + 100 USD Buy forward + 100 USD Overall Position + 100 USD This bank, with its long USD position, will experience a translation loss if the value of the USD falls against the KRW. To hedge against this, it needs to square the position, and this can be achieved in the following four ways. During the pre-crisis period, Korean banks mainly took the last three measures.
USD Forward Sell
If this bank enters a separate forward contract (100 USD) and takes a short position, it can square out the original long position. Since this does not involve any transactions in the spot market, there will be no pressure on the KRW-USD spot rate. An alternative is to enter a CRS receive contract (100 USD) and sell the exact same amount of USD in the spot market. This CRS receive contract allows the bank to enter a short position that will square out the original long position. The contract also increases the bank's USD deposits. To square out this newly created long position, it needs to sell USD in the spot market, which will lower the level of USD deposits to its original level. Since this alternative involves a spot sell, there will be a downward pressure on the KRW-USD spot rate. Another alternative is to enter an FX swap contract (100 USD) that involves a spot buy and a forward sell. Forward sell allows the bank to enter a short position that will square out the original long position. Since the contract involves a spot buy, it increases the bank's USD deposits. To square out this newly created long position, it needs to sell USD in the spot market, which will lower the level of USD deposits to its original level. Since this alternative also involves a spot sell, there will be a downward pressure on the KRW-USD spot rate. The balance sheet and the FX position Lastly, the bank can borrow USD (100 USD) and sell the exact same amount in the spot market. Since dollar borrowing will increase the bank's USD deposits, borrowing itself does not square out the original long position. It needs to sell USD in the spot market, and thereby create a short position. This will lower the USD deposits to its original level. Since this measure also involves a spot sell, there will be a downward pressure on the KRW-USD spot rate. KIC Annual Reports (2007 -2010 
